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Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) are entities or institutions that interpose themselves 
between workers and firms to facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are matched to firms, 
how work is accomplished, and how conflicts are resolved. This paper offers a conceptual 
foundation for analyzing the economic role played by these understudied institutions, and to 
develop a qualitative and, in some cases, quantitative sense of their significance to market 
operation and welfare. Though heterogeneous, I argue that LMIs share a common function, 
which is to redress – and in some cases exploit – a set of endemic departures of labor 
market operation from the efficient neoclassical benchmark. At a rudimentary level, LMIs 
such as online job boards reduce search frictions by aggregating and reselling disparate 
information at a cost below which workers and firms could obtain themselves. Beyond 
passively supplying information, a set of LMIs forcibly redress adverse selection problems in 
labor markets by compelling workers and firms to reveal normally hidden credentials, such as 
criminal background, academic standing, or financial integrity. At their most forceful, LMIs 
such as labor unions and centralized job matching clearinghouses resolve coordination and 
collective action failures in markets by tightly controlling – even monopolizing – the process 
by which workers and firms meet, match and negotiate. A unifying observation of the analytic 
framework is that participation in the activities of a given LMI are typically voluntary for one 
side of the market and compulsory for the other; workers cannot, for example, elect to 
suppress their criminal records and firms cannot opt out of collective bargaining. I argue that 
the nature of participation in an LMI’s activities – voluntary or compulsory, and for which 
parties – is dictated by the market imperfection that it addresses and thus tells us much about 
its economic function. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J2, J4, J5, J6, J8 
  
Keywords:  intermediation, unions, job search, internet, temporary-help, 





David H. Autor  
MIT, E52-371 
Department of Economics 
50 Memorial Drive 
Cambridge MA 02142-1347 
USA 
E-mail: dautor@mit.edu     
                                                 
* This article is the introductory chapter of a volume containing twelve papers that were prepared for 
and presented at the NBER Conference on Labor Market Intermediation in May of 2007, and are 
forthcoming as Studies of Labor Market Intermediation from the University of Chicago Press. The 
conference and resulting volume were generously supported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research and the National Science Foundation (CAREER award SES-0239538). I am particularly 
grateful to James Poterba, Marty Feldstein and Richard Freeman for their intellectual guidance and 
moral and financial support in the development of this endeavor. David J. Pervin of the University of 
Chicago Press, Helena Fitz-Patrick of NBER, and two anonymous referees provided invaluable input 
on the manuscript. I finally thank Carl Beck of NBER for superb coordination of all aspects of the 
conference. 1 
 
Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) are entities or institutions that interpose 
themselves between workers and firms to facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are 
matched to firms, how work is accomplished, and how conflicts are resolved. In the 
textbook competitive model of the labor market, LMIs do not exist—nor is there any 
need for them. If information is complete and markets are competitive, theory suggests 
that decentralized, atomistic labor markets are hard to improve upon.  
Economists have long recognized that labor markets deviate substantially from this 
neoclassical benchmark. Sumner Slichter (1950) observed more than fifty years ago that 
the ‘law of one price’ did not appear to hold in labor markets; seemingly identical 
workers earned markedly different wages depending upon what industry they labored 
in.1 H. Greg Lewis demonstrated in the 1970s that membership in a labor union 
conferred substantial wage benefits, underscoring that atomistic wage-setting is far from 
universal. Akerlof (1970) showed that a small amount of private information in markets 
may be sufficient to thwart trade entirely. Shortly thereafter, Spence (1973) identified a 
set of conditions under which employers might reward workers for acquiring costly 
credentials that have no productive value. During the 1980s, Diamond, Mortensen and 
Pissarides formalized the observation that decentralized labor market search typically 
leads to a market equilibrium with both unfilled jobs and unemployed workers.2 This 
body of theory and evidence suggests that labor market information is not usually 
complete or symmetric, workers are not typically commodities, firms are not always 
price takers, and in general, there may be scope for third parties—Labor Market 
Intermediaries, in particular—to intercede both to improve the operation of the labor 
market and to profit from its imperfections. 
The goal of this volume is to offer a conceptual foundation for analyzing the roles 
that these understudied economic actors play in the labor market, and to develop a 
qualitative and, in some cases, quantitative sense of their significance to market 
operation and worker welfare. The twelve papers in this volume, prepared for and 
presented at the NBER Conference on Labor Market Intermediation in May of 2007, offer 
                                                 
1 This finding was corroborated by, among others, Krueger and Summers (1988) and Katz and 
Summers (1989). 
2 Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), Pissarides (1986). 2 
 
novel empirical analyses of a diverse array of LMIs, including online job search engines, 
criminal records providers, public employment offices, state regulatory bodies, labor 
unions, centralized job matching markets, and temporary help agencies.  Although 
heterogeneous, a central theme of this volume is that these intermediaries serve a 
common role, which is to address a set of endemic departures of labor market operation 
from the neoclassical benchmark. The intellectual challenge taken up by the volume is to 
identify and systematically classify these departures, and to consider how market and 
non-market actors—workers, firms, public officials, non-governmental organizations—
adapt to them to improve or to exploit the decentralized outcomes that result.  
The parsimonious and (I hope) encompassing taxonomy offered by this introductory 
chapter highlights three major deviations of labor market operation from the 
neoclassical benchmark and considers how LMIs potentially address—and in some cases 
exploit –them. These deviations are costly information, adverse selection, and (failures 
of) collective action. This chapter develops this three-part taxonomy and uses it to 
illustrate the underlying economic forces that connect the twelve papers in the volume. 
A unifying observation that emerges is that participation in the activities or services of a 
given LMI are typically voluntary for one side of the market—workers or employers—
and compulsory for the other. I argue that this pattern of voluntary and compulsory 
participation is largely dictated by the nature of the market imperfections that LMIs 
address, and thus can tell us much about the roles that intermediaries play in the 
market. Figure 1, which categorizes LMIs by market function and the nature of worker 
and firm participation (voluntary/compulsory) in their activities, provides a roadmap to 
the main arguments of the chapter.  
I.  Costly information 
In the benchmark neoclassical model of the labor market, it is costless for workers 
and firms to search for each other. In reality, search is costly. Workers pay directly for 
search, through the monetary and psychic costs of applying and interviewing for jobs, 
and indirectly, through foregone work or leisure. Employers likewise incur search costs 
directly, through help-wanted advertising, job fairs, and applicant screening and 
interviewing, and indirectly through foregone output while vacancies await workers. 3 
 
Since information about job vacancies and job-seekers is in large part a public good—in 
particular, each firm would like to be aware of all job-seekers, and each job-seeker 
would like to be aware of all vacancies—this information is likely to be under-supplied 
by the market.  
The first chapters of this volume portray a set of LMIs that serve as ‘information-
only’ intermediaries—entities whose near-exclusive function is to aggregate, package 
and sell information about job-seekers and job vacancies. The leading example of an 
information-only intermediary is the online job board, which serves as a clearinghouse 
for workers seeking jobs and jobs seeking workers. The chapter by Nakamura, Shaw, 
Freeman, Nakamura and Pyman provides an analytic perspective on how the business 
of online job search functions—how firms use it, how workers use it, and how online 
search firms profit from the process.  
While at their most basic level, job boards merely post lists of job-seekers and job 
vacancies, Nakamura et al. outline how the business of online job boards has evolved 
greatly from this rudimentary help-wanted function. Large job boards, like 
Monster.com, CareerBuilder.com, and Hotjobs.yahoo.com, increasingly provide an 
outsourced personnel recruitment function for large employers, hosting the employment 
sections of their corporate web sites, contacting potential candidates en masse, accepting 
and pre-screening resumes, tracking applications, and providing access to an exclusive 
set of candidates—for example, students of elite universities given privileged access to 
these sites as they near the completion of their studies.3 A key point made by Nakamura 
et al. is that, by making it easier for employers to identify potential candidates among 
those currently employed (‘passive seekers’) and simultaneously lowering workers’ 
costs of engaging in on-the-job search, job boards may particularly advantage employed 
relative to non-employed job-seekers.4  
The chapter by Stevenson complements this analytic overview by providing an 
initial empirical analysis of how the Internet may be changing job search behavior in the 
                                                 
3 A related paper by Kroft and Pope (2007) provides evidence on the degree to which online job 
engines, Craigslist in particular, have displaced the traditional newspaper help-wanted business.  
4 A 2004 paper by Kugler and Saint Paul considers how the imposition of firing costs in the 
presence of worker adverse selection differentially disadvantages non-employed relative to 
employed job-seekers.   4 
 
United States. Stevenson documents that the variety of job search methods used by 
unemployed U.S. workers has increased significantly over the last decade, coincident 
with the rapid rise in Internet penetration. Moreover, in U.S. states where Internet 
penetration has risen the most, the unemployed appear increasingly likely to use job 
advertisements for seeking and contacting employers directly—suggesting that online 
and offline search may be complements. Consonant with the observations by Nakamura 
et al., Stevenson shows that the vast majority of workers using the Internet to gather 
information about employment are those who are already employed. Logically, workers 
who use the Internet for job search are more likely to leave their current employer. It is 
plausible—though far from certain—that online job search may increase the rate at 
which workers change jobs.5  
II.  Mitigating adverse selection 
While pure ‘information-only’ intermediaries address an important public goods 
problem, this category of LMI is relatively narrow and, I would argue, less consequential 
than the bulk of the LMIs discussed below. The reason is that where information is 
costly, the central economic problem is typically not exclusively costly information but 
also asymmetric information. Specifically, if information about the quality of workers or 
jobs is incomplete, better-informed market actors have an incentive to exploit their 
informational advantage to the detriment of less-informed market actors. As first 
outlined by Akerlof (1970), these information asymmetries readily generate a market 
equilibrium where lower quality market actors (workers or firms) exert negative 
externalities on their higher quality counterparts, depressing both the quantity and 
quality of trade.  
While job boards might appear to offer a powerful mechanism to bolster aggregate 
labor market efficiency, qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that job boards 
do not reach this potential. An analysis of U.S. job search data by Kuhn and Skuterud 
(2004) finds that workers who use the Internet to search for jobs fare no better—and 
                                                 
5 If the Internet provides incumbent workers with better information about their outside 
opportunities, these workers do not need to change jobs to benefit. Web sites like 
greedyassociates.com, for example, which publicize the salary offers made to newly minted 
attorneys, may serve to homogenize the distribution of law firm associate wages. 5 
 
perhaps worse—than observably similar workers who do not search for jobs using the 
Internet. Their analysis suggests that either Internet job search is ineffective at reducing 
unemployment durations or Internet job searchers are negatively selected on 
unobservables. One recruiting executive, quoted in Autor (2001b), lends informal 
support to the latter hypothesis, asserting that job boards are populated by four 
adversely selected pools: “The unhappy (and thus probably not a desirable employee); 
the curious (and therefore likely to be a ‘job-hopper’); the unpromotable (probably for a 
reason); and the unemployed (probably for a worse reason).” 
The core problem facing job boards—reflected in the above quotation—is that 
workers posting their resumes and credentials online face a strong incentive to conceal 
or slant information to make themselves more attractive to potential employers. 
Recognizing this, employers are likely to treat information posted to job boards with 
skepticism. If in equilibrium, employers view the information on job boards as 
untrustworthy, these boards can do little more than provide employers with names and 
numbers, leaving them to discover essential information about worker skills and 
qualifications through other mechanisms such as interviews, background checks, and 
job references.  
A natural solution to this asymmetric information problem is compulsory disclosure; 
if job-seekers can be compelled to reveal information that they would not necessarily 
disclose voluntarily, this could substantially improve the efficiency of job search and 
matching—though clearly not all workers would benefit. Though compulsory disclosure 
sounds difficult to achieve in real world labor markets, Chapters 3 and 4 study two 
Labor Market Intermediaries that perform exactly this function: reducing worker-side 
adverse selection by, implicitly or explicitly, compelling job applicants to reveal 
information that they might otherwise conceal.  
A key piece of information that employers may seek to ascertain is criminal history. 
As Chapter 3 by Keith Finlay reveals, almost 20 percent of black males and more than 10 
percent of white males in recent U.S. youth cohorts have been incarcerated by age 24. 
Historically, criminal background checks have been comparatively expensive to 
perform, and not particularly reliable. Between 1998 and the present, however more 
than a dozen US states placed their criminal history records databases online for use by 6 
 
employers and other interested parties. Implicitly, job-seekers applying for jobs in ‘open 
records’ states are now compelled to submit to a criminal background check at the 
employer’s discretion. The opening of criminal records therefore functions as a publicly 
operated LMI that may in theory reduce worker-side adverse selection. 
How does this opening affect labor market operation in practice? Working from a 
simple statistical discrimination framework, Finlay hypothesizes that if employers do 
not initially observe applicants’ criminal histories and instead attempt to infer them 
based on other observable characteristics (such as education, age, gender and race), the 
opening of criminal records should diminish the labor market prospects of ex-offenders 
while potentially benefiting non-offenders who might otherwise be viewed as potential 
criminals. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1997 Cohort, 
Finlay finds support for the first proposition. Young adults with criminal histories face 
reduced employment odds and lower wages after states make criminal histories 
available online. There is less evidence, however, that young adults without criminal 
records who appear demographically similar to potential criminals fare better once 
criminal records are opened. This result may indicate that employers underestimate the 
prevalence of criminality in the absence of open criminal records—and hence, opening 
of criminal records impedes applicants who are revealed to be offenders without 
benefiting those who are revealed to be non-offenders. As Finlay cautions, however, the 
relatively small NLSY 97 sample provide insufficient power to detect the diffuse benefits 
hypothesized to accrue to the non-offender population. What appears unambiguous is 
that opening of criminal records does diminish the labor market prospects of ex-
offenders.  
Although both online job postings and online criminal records potentially serve to 
reduce search costs in labor markets, the crucial distinction between these LMIs from the 
perspective of this chapter lies in the nature of information disclosure. Users of job 
boards may reveal, disclose or simply fabricate information at will. Job applicants in 
‘open records’ states have no say in whether their criminal backgrounds are made 
publicly available. It appears plausible that this distinction explains why open records 
have real bite: they credibly supply information about worker credentials that applicants 
might otherwise conceal  7 
 
The chapter by Bagues and Labini studies an unusual job search engine, AlmaLaurea, 
which also has this compulsory revelation feature. Founded in 1994 by an inter-
university consortium of Italian universities, AlmaLaurea was set up to increase the 
frequency of successful school-to-work transitions among Italian university graduates, 
which have been astonishingly low in recent decades. What distinguishes AlmaLaurea 
from most electronic job boards it that it provides detailed administrative records on 
participants’ courses of study, grades obtained and rank in class. Moreover, it provides 
this information for almost the entire set of students currently graduating from the 
universities in the consortium. In effect, AlmaLaurea offers the university equivalent of 
‘open records’ for job applicants: a college transcript, a class ranking, and, implicitly, a 
comparison of each applicant to his immediate peers.  
A thoroughgoing empirical analysis by Bagues and Labini offers compelling 
evidence that AlmaLaurea reduced the non-employment rate of graduates of AlmaLaurea 
member universities. Specifically, comparing changes in the non-employment rate of 
graduates of universities joining AlmaLaurea over 1998 to 2001 relative to graduates of 
universities that had not yet joined during this period suggests that AlmaLaurea reduced 
the non-employment rate of AlmaLaurea graduates by several percentage points—which 
is considerable. Because Italian labor market conditions were rapidly improving during 
the time period studied, there is room for concern that the difference-in-difference 
approach employed might be unreliable.  Bagues and Labini do much to allay this 
concern, including conducting placebo tests of the AlmaLaurea ‘treatment’ in the pre-
treatment period, and exploiting a second wave of AlmaLaurea roll-outs to confirm the 
main finding.  
The AlmaLaurea study leaves open two questions that subsequent research will want 
to address. First, did the reduction in unemployment of AlmaLaurea graduates come in 
part at the expense of other potential workers? Intuition might suggest yes, but initial 
analysis by Bagues and Labini suggests otherwise. Alternatively, if AlmaLaurea primarily 
expanded the total employment roster, what does this imply about the magnitude of 
search costs or adverse selection in the Italian labor market absent AlmaLaurea? A second 
question ripe for study is whether AlmaLaurea resulted in a redistribution of 
opportunities among job candidates within member institutions. Since AlmaLaurea was 8 
 
built to facilitate direct comparisons among candidates from member universities, it is 
plausible that it produced both winners and losers—improving opportunities for the 
most distinguished students and reducing them for the least distinguished.6  
Adverse selection is not of course limited to the worker side of the labor market. 
Firms may equally face incentives to exploit asymmetric information to the detriment of 
workers and customers. The chapter by Woong Lee confronts the problem of adverse 
selection of firms, in particular, firms that are themselves LMIs. Lee’s chapter provides 
an original empirical analysis of the rise of US Public Employment Offices (PEOs) at the 
turn of the 20th century. At that time, the services of private, for-profit employment 
agencies were widely sought by job-seekers, particularly by unskilled workers and 
migrants. The lack of sophistication of these job-seekers, however, left them vulnerable 
to exploitation. Some of the abuses perpetrated by for-profit employment agencies 
included sending job-seekers to distant locations where no work existed, colluding with 
employers to provide applicants with only temporary work stints followed by summary 
discharge, and (occasionally) sending unwitting female job-seekers to brothels. Thus, 
for-profit employment agencies appear to have heavily exploited precisely the 
information asymmetries they were hired to resolve.  
For U.S. state governments facing this predicament, several remedies were 
conceivable, including regulating and licensing for-profit employment agencies or 
banning them outright. The approach pursued by the states, however, was ingenious. 
Rather than attempting to directly curtail the behavior of abusers, states chose to 
effectively compete them out of business by offering high quality employment assistance 
services at Public Employment Offices at no cost to job-seekers. This response seems to 
reflect a pinpoint diagnosis of the market failure and its remedy. By introducing 
competition between for-profit LMIs and reputable public sector LMIs, states likely 
drove many of the lowest-quality PEOs out of business. What was left behind, 
presumably, were PEOs thatoffered sufficient value-added to justify a positive price 
despite the presence of a reputable, zero-cost competitor.  
                                                 
6 This outcome would also be consonant with the reasoning of the Finlay study. 9 
 
The chapter by Dick Todd and Morris Kleiner considers another example of a public 
response to a perceived failure of intermediation, in this case by mortgage brokers. 
Mortgage brokers are for-profit agents (individuals of firms) that match potential 
mortgage borrowers with lenders and assist borrowers in completing the loan 
origination process. These brokers were insignificant in the mortgage market in 1980, 
but by 2004 were involved in approximately 68 percent of all mortgages originated. 
Coinciding with their rapid growth was a rise in public concern that market failures 
prevented competition from effectively disciplining brokers’ quality of service.7 As 
mortgage brokering grew, numerous states passed laws requiring brokers to post surety 
bonds or maintain a minimum net worth in order to operate. These requirements 
potentially work to ensure that borrowers have financial recourse if brokers are 
malfeasant. In addition, because sellers of surety bonds would be expected to charge 
risky brokers a higher price, bonding requirements create an entry barrier that is 
potentially more onerous for low than high quality mortgage brokers.  
Consistent with this reasoning, Kleiner and Todd show that bonding requirements 
reduced mortgage broker employment, curtailed subprime loan originations and 
increased the observed qualification levels (measured by education and experience) of 
brokers operating in the mortgage broker occupation. Interestingly, however, Kleiner 
and Todd also find that bonding requirements increased mortgage foreclosure rates and 
raised the probability that newly originated loans were high-priced relative to other 
loans with similar characteristics. While Kleiner and Todd advise appropriate caution in 
interpreting these adverse impacts, they note that they are consistent with the influential 
arguments of Friedman (1962) that occupational licensing requirements dampen market 
discipline and produce artificial scarcity, leading to higher fees for providers and lower 
quality for consumers.8  
While mortgage brokers are arguably product market rather than labor market 
intermediaries, they have much in common with the for-profit employment offices 
                                                 
7 This concern was exacerbated by the fact that mortgage brokers dominated the origination of 
so-called subprime mortgages—that is, loans to borrowers who would not be considered 
creditworthy by traditional lending standards. 
8 For an extensive treatment of this topic, see Kleiner’s (2006) monograph on occupational 
licensing.  10 
 
studied by Woong Lee. Both employment offices and mortgage brokers serve to match 
individuals on one side of the market (workers or borrowers) to sellers on the other side 
(employers or mortgage lenders). The role played by these intermediaries is a natural 
market response to the problem posed by costly search. There is, however, an adverse 
selection problem that intrinsically arises in this setting: intermediaries that are in the 
business of selling information are, by nature, better informed about information they 
sell than are the customers they serve. A wealth of theory and evidence suggests that 
markets are unlikely to operate optimally when sellers and buyers are not equally 
informed. As the chapters by Lee and Kleiner and Todd suggest, some subset of 
intermediaries will use their informational advantage to exploit rather than to assist 
customers.  
These parallels suggest some general lessons on the mixed role that intermediaries 
play in reducing information costs in labor markets. Since the public good of labor 
market information is likely to be underprovided by the free market, a set of LMIS will 
find it profitable to collect and sell information at a cost below that which job-seekers 
could obtain by their own efforts. These intermediaries mitigate the under-provision 
problem. But their informational advantage also potentially gives rise to another market 
failure, which is information asymmetry and the attendant risk of adverse selection. 
Whether this asymmetric information problem is moderate or severe depends in part on 
the market structure in which intermediaries operate. In the case of private employment 
agencies at the turn of the 20th century, these abuses were apparently profound. But a 
change in market structure, fostered by competition between public and private-sector 
providers substantially mitigated the problem. In the case of mortgage brokers, it is less 
certain that the regulatory remedy—creating barriers to entry—provided the structural 
change needed.  
In both cases, it is significant that the policy response to adverse selection included 
forcible public intervention in the market: an injection of competition in the case of 
Public Employment Offices; the imposition of bonding requirements in the case of 
mortgage brokers. These examples reinforce the general observation that, to address 
significant market imperfections, LMIs must be capable of changing the incentives faced 
by at least one set of market agents, typically workers or firms.  11 
 
III. Solving collective action problems 
Providing information—even compelling it—is not necessarily sufficient to resolve 
market failures. Notifying a bank’s deposit holders that the institution faces a small risk 
of insolvency does not make a run on the bank less likely—rather, it spurs each 
depositor to withdraw his funds, thus ensuring collapse. In such cases, rational agents 
acting with full information and accurate expectations about one-another’s actions make 
decisions that are privately optimal yet collectively suboptimal. There is potential in 
such settings for market intermediaries to improve upon competitive outcomes. But this 
is only feasible if these intermediaries have teeth—or, more specifically, the power to 
change payoffs so that the maximizing choices of actors on one or both sides of the 
market also serve the common good.  
The chapters by Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth and by Richard Freeman and Marit 
Rehavi consider two such intermediaries. Niederle and Roth analyze the labor market 
for medical fellowships (post-residency training) in the specialty of gastroenterology. 
Unraveling is widespread in entry-level labor markets for highly specialized positions, 
including legal clerkships and medical specialties. Candidates in these fields often sign 
binding employment contracts one or more years prior to the start of work—well before 
the quality of job matches can be reliably assessed. And job offers are frequently made 
with short (‘exploding’) decision deadlines and substantial professional penalties for 
reneging. The allocative efficiency of such a matching process is likely to be poor.  
The Niederle and Roth chapter offers a diagnosis of the market failures in entry-level 
specialty markets and a quantitative analysis of how these problems were manifest and 
subsequently resolved (at least for some time) by the LMI of a centralized fellowship 
match. Niederle and Roth argue that the underlying cause of market unraveling is 
congestion. In occupations where most entry-level candidates enter the labor market 
simultaneously (i.e., as a cohort completes its studies), there is typically insufficient time 
for employers to evaluate and make offers to all relevant candidates before competing 
offers have already been made and accepted. This congestion spurs employers to make 
time-limited (exploding) offers to candidates to reduce the risk that, should their initial 
offers be declined, they are left to hire from the residual candidate pool. When 
exploding offers become commonplace, employers quickly recognize that they can 12 
 
employ them strategically to make job markets artificially ‘thin’ for their preferred 
candidates. Specifically, by forcing a candidate to make a binding decision before her 
alternative offers are known, an exploding offer turns the candidate’s simultaneous 
decision problem into a sequential decision problem. Such strategies naturally lead to 
unraveling: anticipating that their competitors will make exploding job offers, each 
employer has an incentive to accelerate its own offers.  
A primary implication of Niederle and Roth’s diagnosis is that market unraveling 
could potenetially be checked if job offers were effectively delayed (or made non-
binding) until candidates and employers had sufficient time to search over their relevant 
choice sets. The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), studied by Niederle and 
Roth, performs this function. The NRMP provides a centralized clearinghouse where 
applicants and employers submit rank ordered lists representing their preferences. 
Applying a set of deferred acceptance algorithms, the NRMP allocates candidates to 
fellowships.9 Candidates participating in the match are, in theory, not bound by job 
offers initiated prior to the resolution of the match—thus nullifying the power of 
exploding offers to constrain their choices. Employer participation in the match is 
voluntary, however, and the value of participation will depend positively on the fraction 
of competitors who are also participating.  
A compelling feature of Niederle and Roth’s quantitative case study of the 
gastroenterology (GI) market is that the profession adopted a centralized match in 1989 
in response to widespread signs of market malfunction, but participation in the match 
began to decline after six years, and the match was formally abandoned in 2000. This set 
of events yields two pre-post contrasts for quantitative study, one prior to the match’s 
adoption and the other subsequent to its demise. The available evidence suggests that 
the centralized match mitigated some clear market maladies, dramatically compressing 
the highly dispersed timing of job offers (which led to artificial thinness) and increasing 
the mobility of GI residents out of the hospitals where they performed their residences 
(suggesting that the match reduced monopsony power among incumbent employers). 
                                                 
9 As the chapter discusses, the results of such a match are stable—that is, there exists no 
applicant-employer pair, not matched to one another, who would prefer each other to their 
current match. Moreover, it is generally (though not always) incentive-compatible for applicants 
to submit their true preferences to the clearinghouse. 13 
 
The chapter also examines the contentious question of whether the centralized match 
depressed fellowship salaries below competitive levels. Niederle and Roth find 
essentially no difference in salary levels between specialties that use a match and those 
that do not, suggesting that centralized matching does not dampen salaries per se. 
Equally remarkable, however, is that the data reveal almost no economically significant 
variation in fellowship salary levels or dispersion across the 14 specialties considered. 
This absence of variation raises the question of whether, in addition to congestion, the 
maladies of the fellowship market are in part explained by other non-competitive 
factors.  
 The GI matching market example underscores the potential of a Labor Market 
Intermediary to resolve collective action problems, in this case, restraining employers 
from making early offers. The demise of the GI match in 2000, however, suggests that 
something was amiss. Niederle and Roth trace the breakdown of the match to a sudden 
and substantial falloff in the supply of GI fellows spurred by a policy change by the 
Gastroenterology Leadership Council. When in 1996, the number of fellows fell below 
the number of available fellowship slots, the temptation for employers to circumvent the 
match to guarantee their supply of labor may simply have become overwhelming. And 
because employer participation in the match was voluntary, the matching intermediary 
had no teeth with which to discipline defectors. The match therefore unraveled as initial 
defections spurred further defections, rendering the match irrelevant by 2000. The GI 
case again underscores that the ability to compel participation by at least one side of the 
market—and perhaps by both—is a necessary requirement for an LMI to redress a 
market failure, in this case, a collective action failure. The GI fellowship match appears 
to have had this power when the labor market was slack, but not when it was tight. 
The Freeman and Rehavi chapter, which offers an innovative study of the changing 
shape of labor unions, provides a compelling point of comparison to the GI case. While 
the National Resident Matching Program is an LMI with the power to change market 
payoffs (at least some of the time), labor unions are an LMI adapting to the loss of this 
power. Unions have historically solved collective action problems among atomistic 
workers by organizing collective bargaining, sanctioning employers for misconduct, and 
regulating employers’ hiring and dismissal policies. A key to their ability to perform this 14 
 
function in the United States is the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which compels 
employers to bargain collectively with a labor union if a majority of the firm’s 
employees votes for union representation. Thus, once a union is established, it holds an 
effective monopoly on bargaining.  
While survey evidence suggests that worker demand for union representation has 
increased with time, union density in the US has fallen to almost negligible levels (7.4 
percent in 2006). Labor unions have also lost their efficacy in the UK, where the range of 
issues subject to collective bargaining has narrowed. If unions can no longer generate 
sizable member benefits, their ability to build membership and levy dues diminishes, 
reducing their power further. This threatens their viability as an LMI. 
Against this backdrop, Freeman and Rehavi study an alternative organizing model 
for unions, which they refer to as ‘open source.’ In the open source model, unions are 
decoupled from workplaces and do not collectively bargain. They attract members by 
offering a package of services such as legal advice, group employment benefits (e.g., 
health insurance), and political lobbying on labor issues. Two features of this open 
source model represent a radical departure from the traditional labor union mode. First, 
open source unions lack what is certainly the most effective tool that traditional unions 
possessed for generating member benefits: collective bargaining. Second, many of the 
services that open source unions will purportedly provide, such as lobbying, are non-
excludable public goods. This leaves them highly vulnerable to free-riding, which was 
essentially impossible when union membership and compulsory dues-paying were 
preconditions for participation in collective bargaining. This ‘open source’ model will 
sharply limit the membership fees that such unions can charge.   
Despite these threats, Freeman and Rehavi see reasons for tempered optimism about 
unions’ prospects in the current era. A first is that the Internet has greatly augmented 
the capability of unions to communicate with potential members outside of the 
workplace, and at much lower cost than door-to-door canvassing. Moreover, the set of 
union services that can be provided over the Internet has proven to extend beyond mere 
online replication of traditional direct-mail and fundraising operations. Freeman and 
Rehavi’s innovative analysis of question-and-answer postings (‘threads’) on the website 
of unionreps.org provides a compelling example of a union successfully using the 15 
 
Internet to provide a set of tangible, individual-level member services, most 
importantly, legal advice on workplace matters.   
As another example, Freeman and Rehavi consider the success of a non-workplace-
based union, Working America (a “community-affiliate” of the AFL-CIO union), which 
enrolled two million workers between 2004 and 2007 by canvassing at homes and over 
the Internet. Working America’s success in drawing membership suggests, consistent 
with survey evidence, that there is considerable latent demand for organized labor as a 
political movement. Working America’s direct membership benefits are, however, quite 
limited relative to a traditional labor union, and its fee structure is accordingly modest. 
If unions are successful in reconstituting under the ‘open source’ model, my 
expectation is that this will reflect a profound change in their core function as Labor 
Market Intermediaries. Whereas traditional labor unions primarily served, in the 
taxonomy of this chapter, as enforcers of collective action, ‘open source’ unions appear 
poised to serve primarily as information-provision intermediaries—more akin to job 
boards than to the medical match studied by Niederle and Roth. Thus, if the power to 
compel participation is the sine qua non of LMIs that move the market equilibrium, the 
potential of open source unions to generate worker benefits that approach that of unions 
of an earlier era is likely to be limited.  
IV. Temporary help agencies: What do they do for workers? What do they do to the 
market?  
More than any other Labor Market Intermediary, the temporary help industry has 
been the subject of intensive recent debate. This is in part due to its spectacular growth. 
In the U.S., the temporary help industry accounted for 10 percent of net job creation 
during the decade of the 1990s (Autor 2003). In continental Europe and the United 
Kingdom, temporary help agency employment increased its share of average daily 
employment from 1.0 to 1.8 percent between 1986 and 1996. In the same interval, the 
number of workers employed by temporary help agencies more than tripled in 
Germany, Denmark and Ireland. In Japan, temporary help employment grew four-fold 
following significant deregulation (CIETT 2007).  16 
 
Accompanying the growth of temporary help employment has been a qualitative 
change in the type of jobs filled by temporary help agencies. Historically, temporary 
help agency jobs were synonymous with clerical and office work. By 2005, a larger share 
of temporary help jobs in the U.S. was found in production, transportation, and material 
moving jobs than in clerical or sales occupations.10 As temporary help jobs have moved 
into blue-collar occupations, the industry has become an increasingly important 
employer of less-skilled workers. Although it accounts for less than 3 percent of average 
US daily employment, U.S. state administrative data show that 15 to 40 percent of 
former welfare recipients who obtained employment in the years following the 1996 US 
welfare reform took jobs in the temporary help sector (Autor and Houseman 2005). 
Alongside their traditional role of filling short-term staffing needs, temporary help jobs 
are increasingly used by employers to screen workers for direct-hire positions at arm’s 
length (‘temp-to-hire’) without the attendant risk of litigation should the match end 
badly. 
The rapid growth of temporary help employment among low-skilled workers and 
the increasing prevalence of temp-to-perm arrangements has spurred an academic and 
policy debate as to whether temporary help jobs facilitate or hinder labor market 
advancement of job-seekers. Numerous researchers have hypothesized that stints in 
temporary help employment enable workers to develop skills and contacts that 
eventually lead to stable, long-term employment. Moreover, because temporary help 
firms face uniquely low marginal costs of hiring and firing, these firms may be willing to 
‘audition’ candidates who would otherwise have difficulty finding direct-hire jobs 
(Abraham 1988; Katz and Krueger 1999; Autor 2001a and 2003; Houseman 2001; Autor 
and Houseman 2002; Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2003; Kalleberg, Reynolds, and 
Marsden 2003). But these hypothesized benefits are uncertain. Scholars and practitioners 
have also argued that the unstable and primarily low-skilled positions available through 
temporary help agencies provide little opportunity for workers to develop human 
capital or engage in productive job search (Parker 1994; Pawasarat 1997; Jorgenson and 
                                                 
10 Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.toc.htm, accessed 
1/20/2008 (based upon Current Population Survey February 2005 Contingent Worker 
Supplement). 17 
 
Riemer 2000; Benner, Leete and Pastor 2007). If spells with temporary help agencies also 
inhibit workers from engaging in productive job search—after all, job search takes 
time—temporary help employment might hinder workers from obtaining stable jobs.  
Distinguishing among these competing hypotheses is a significant empirical 
challenge. It is inherently difficult to differentiate the effects of holding given job types 
from the skills and motivations that cause workers to hold these jobs initially. Four 
chapters in this volume take steps in this direction, however, by studying the role that 
temporary help jobs play in the labor market advancement of job-seekers in Portugal, 
Germany, and the United States. 
Before discussing the findings of these chapters, it is useful to consider the 
temporary help industry through the conceptual lens applied to other LMIs—that is, as 
institutions that potentially redress market imperfections arising from decentralized job 
matching between workers and firms. The market imperfection to which temporary help 
firms primarily address themselves is the fixed cost of job search. Identifying, screening 
and hiring workers is a fixed cost that must be sunk before actual paid work gets done. 
This cost may not be worth sinking if the job to be filled is brief or has a short shelf life, 
e.g., substituting for an employee who falls ill for a week. Temporary help firms sink 
these fixed costs up front by pre-screening workers and clients. They defray these sunk 
costs by introducing a wedge between the hourly wage billed to the client firm and the 
hourly wage (and other payroll costs) paid to the temporary worker.  
Unlike most of the LMIs considered above, temporary help agencies function on a 
two-sided voluntary participation model; neither workers nor firms are obliged to use 
their services unless they see gains from doing so. From the firm’s perspective, the gain 
to temporary help arrangements is that they convert their fixed job search costs into 
marginal costs by providing a supply of pre-screened workers who are waiting at the 
gate. From the job-seeker’s perspective, temporary help agencies potentially offer 
immediate short-term, hourly employment with almost no initial, fixed investment in 
job search.11 In addition, temporary help arrangements facilitate arms length screening 
                                                 
11 Why, given these efficiencies, are the majority of jobs not found through temporary help firms? 
A likely answer is that, due to their informational advantage on both the supply and demand 
side of the labor market, temporary help firms find it optimal to charge a relatively high markup 18 
 
by allowing firms to audition workers without the attendant fixed costs of hiring and the 
legal risks of firing. The possibility of a ‘temp-to-perm’ transition also makes temporary 
help positions more attractive to workers, many of whom report using temporary help 
as a means of job search (Autor 2001a).  
These observations—in particular, the fact that temporary help agencies rely on 
voluntary two-sided participation—immediately suggests that their potential to 
substantially change labor market outcomes for individual workers or firms is likely to be 
limited; if this were not so, these arrangements would either be much less common or 
much more prevalent. This does not imply that temporary help firms neither help nor 
harm workers (or firms) at the margin. Indeed, Autor and Houseman (2005) provide 
quasi-experimental evidence that low-skilled former welfare recipients in the U.S. 
placed in temporary help agency jobs receive no lasting earnings or employment 
benefits from these placements, whereas ex ante identical individuals placed in direct-
hire positions accrue substantial earnings gains over the course of two to three years 
following placement. Nevertheless, if temporary help agency employment exists in 
equilibrium alongside other employment forms, it is unlikely that temporary help jobs 
are either strictly dominant or strictly dominated by either employment arrangements.  
The evidence presented in the final four chapters of the volume appears to 
corroborate this reasoning, though with many important nuances. The study by René 
Böheim and Ana Rute Cardoso uses uniquely detailed, linked worker-firm data from 
Portugal to analyze whether workers suffer a wage penalty either while working for 
temporary help firms or in the two years following entry into temporary help 
employment. As a descriptive matter, their analysis confirms that workers in temporary 
help jobs earn about 10 percent less than observationally similar workers in non-
temporary help (‘direct-hire’) jobs. But once person fixed-effects are included to account 
for unobserved worker heterogeneity, this wage penalty disappears or becomes positive. 
                                                                                                                                                 
on their services. This markup, estimated at 40 to 60 percentage points above the hourly wage 
paid to the worker (Autor, Levy and Murnane 1999), provides workers and firms with an 
incentive to circumvent temporary-help arrangements for longer-term matches.  Similarly to 
mortgage brokers and for-profit employment agencies, temporary-help agencies hold an 
informational advantage relative to their clients, and, as seen in other examples, this gives rise to 
its own difficulties—here, monopsonistic pricing.  19 
 
These results imply that there is negative self-selection of workers into temporary help 
jobs in Portugal, a pattern also documented for the United States (Segal and Sullivan, 
1997).12 
While Böheim and Cardoso focus primarily on earnings in temporary help jobs, the 
chapters by Carolyn Heinrich, Peter Muesuer and Kenneth Troske, Frederick 
Andersson, Harry Holzer and Julia Lane, and Michael Kvasnika study the question of 
whether temporary help jobs augment or inhibit labor market advancement over the 
longer-term. Using employment register data from Germany, Kvasnicka analyzes 
whether unemployed job-seekers who take temporary help jobs are more likely to later 
obtain direct-hire employment than observationally similar workers who do not take 
temporary help jobs. The analytical tool used in this study is a matching estimator, 
which identifies pairs of workers who are observationally similar up to the point where 
one member of the pair obtains a temporary help job. From this point of divergence 
forward, the estimator compares the trajectory of the two workers to estimate of the 
impact of temporary help employment on the ‘treated’ relative to the ‘non-treated’ 
worker over the subsequent four years.  
Contrary to many studies of temporary help employment in European countries, 
Kvasnicka’s analysis finds no evidence that temporary help employment increases job-
takers’ subsequent rate of direct-hire employment over four years. However, the data 
clearly show that workers who enter temporary help employment from unemployment 
are substantially more likely to remain in temporary help jobs over the subsequent four 
years. Kvasnicka concludes that temporary help jobs increase workers’ employment and 
earnings in the temporary help sector without causing any crowd-out of their 
advancement into direct-hire employment. As with all studies based on observational 
(i.e., non-experimental) data, one must also consider the possibility that the results are in 
part driven by unobserved differences in skills and motivations among different groups 
of workers. Ultimately, the validity of this approach hinges on the assumption that the 
                                                 
12 Böheim and Cardoso also estimate that workers who have previously held a temporary-help 
job suffer no measurable wage penalty when entering direct-hire employment. Interpretation of 
this result deserves particular caution, however, since the analysis is conditioned on remaining in 
employment (wages are not otherwise observed). 20 
 
treatment variable (temporary help job employment) can be treated as randomly 
assigned conditional on the observable variables used for the matching estimator. 
Similar in spirit to the Böheim and Cardoso study, the chapter by Andersson, Holzer 
and Lane estimates a model of worker earnings that includes both worker and firm fixed 
effects. Distinct from Böheim and Cardoso, the fixed effects model in this chapter draws 
on earnings data from an earlier time period, thus making the fixed-effect more akin to a 
measure of workers’ permanent earnings and firms’ average salaries than a conventional 
fixed-effects estimator. A particular strength of the Andersson et al. chapter is its 
rigorous analysis of the trajectory of employment by sector. The chapter explores not 
only whether workers in temporary help jobs later obtain direct-hire employment, but 
also whether these jobs are found in high wage industries and with high wage 
employers. The key result of this analysis is that, although workers earn comparatively 
low wages while in temporary help jobs, their subsequent earnings are often relatively 
high—but only if they succeed in gaining stable work with direct-hire employers. 
Consistent with the view that selective firms use temporary help arrangements to screen 
workers for desirable direct-hire jobs, the chapter documents that temporary help 
workers who successfully transition to stable, direct-hire employment often end up 
employed by relatively high wage firms.  
A question left open in part by the Andersson et al. chapter is the role played by 
worker heterogeneity. In particular, for workers who successfully transition from 
temporary help employment to stable, direct-hire jobs, it is difficult to know whether 
their spells in temporary help employment were the cause of these successful transitions 
or primarily a waypoint on the route that these workers were navigating. The chapter by 
Heinrich, Mueser and Troske makes an ambitious effort to assess the importance of self-
selection in this context, drawing on recent econometric techniques developed by 
Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005). Altonji et al. argue that it is feasible to assess the likely 
extent of bias stemming from self-selection on unobserved variables by measuring the 
extent of self-selection on observed variables. The key to their approach is the maintained 
hypothesis that self-selection on observables and unobservables is positively correlated. 
Concretely, imagine that in estimating the effect of temporary help employment on 
subsequent employment outcomes, a researcher finds that including a worker’s 21 
 
educational attainment in the statistical model leads to a substantial increase in the 
estimated benefits from temporary help employment. This pattern would indicate that 
there is significant negative self-selection into temporary help employment based on 
education (an observable variable).13 Under the assumptions of the Altonji et al. 
framework, this would further imply that selection on unobserved variables, such as 
latent human capital or taste for effort, is also likely to be important. By contrast, if the 
estimates were found to be largely invariant to the exclusion of all subsets of observable 
variables, this would serve as evidence that self-selection on unobservables is unlikely to 
be important.  
Heinrich et al. put these ideas into practice by studying the employment and 
earnings trajectories of individuals in the state of Missouri who sought employment 
assistance or cash support through one of several federal assistance programs. 
Consistent with prior research by the authors (Heinrich et al., 2005), they document that 
the temporary help industry plays a uniquely important role as a transitional source of 
employment for low-skilled job-seekers. A key finding of their chapter is that stints in 
temporary help employment have little measurable effect on subsequent earnings or 
employment. Yet, consistent with Andersson et al., Heinrich et al. observe that 
successful transitions from the temporary help sector are critical to workers’ labor 
market advancement; workers who remain in temporary help employment experience 
long-run earnings that are substantially below those of workers in other sectors.  
A major contribution of the Heinrich et al. chapter is their application of the Altonji 
et al. method to assess the likelihood that the causal effects estimated from the 
observational data are spurious. This analysis presents a nuanced picture. For earnings, 
the Altonji et al. test is frequently consistent with the null hypothesis that the causal 
effects estimates are not spurious. For employment, this is less often the case. Though 
these results present a somewhat ambiguous picture, one cannot fail to be impressed by 
the rigor, clarity and intellectual candor of the Heinrich et al. analysis. Economic 
                                                 
13 Specifically, we take as given that education is strongly positively correlated with earnings and 
other positive labor market outcomes. If adding education to a wage regression raises the 
coefficient on temporary-help employment, this implies that temporary-help employment and 
education are negatively correlated, i.e., there is negative self-selection into temporary-help 
employment based on education.  22 
 
knowledge and credibility would be well served if more researchers subjected their 
findings to equally rigorous sensitivity testing.  
In net, these four chapters, using disparate data sources from three different 
industrialized economies, have a clear commonality of conclusions. None suggests that 
temporary help jobs have any lasting negative effect on the workers who obtain them. 
Whether holding these jobs has positive effects on worker outcomes relative to what they 
would have obtained in the absence of temporary help employment is less certain. As a 
descriptive matter, many temporary help workers transition from temporary help to 
direct-hire jobs at higher wages. Simultaneously, those who stay behind fare relatively 
poorly. It is a certainty that those who stay behind over the longer term are on average 
adversely selected—that is, their unobserved skills or motivation put them at a 
disadvantage relative to other workers. By the same token, those who leave temporary 
help employment for higher-paying and more durable direct-hire positions are likely 
positively selected. These countervailing forces of selection make it difficult to conclude 
with certainty if the causal effect of temporary help employment is positive, or merely 
neutral, for the subset of workers making successful transitions from temporary help to 
direct-hire employment.   
This set of findings suggest a relatively benign labor market role for temporary help 
agencies. Yet, there exists substantial suspicion among policymakers and social scientists 
(particularly outside of economics) that temporary help jobs are exploitative, offering 
below-market pay and limited opportunities for advancement. From whence does this 
suspicion arise? One possibility is that because temporary help agencies are for-profit 
LMIs—unlike, for example, labor unions, public employment agencies, or university job 
placement consortia—they face a pecuniary incentive to minimize wages and benefits, 
and to inhibit workers from obtaining other, potentially superior, positions. In this 
respect, however, temporary help agencies appear no different from other employers, 
and so it is hard to credit this viewpoint.  
Perhaps a more compelling argument is that widespread use of temporary help 
agencies, even if beneficial to individual workers and firms, may exert a negative 
externality on the aggregate labor market—that is, it is a ‘public bad.’ One case in point 
for this argument is that temporary-agency workers cannot vote in union certification 23 
 
elections at client firms since, for legal purposes, the temporary help agency is their 
employer of record. Moreover, temporary help workers are nearly impossible to 
organize at their temporary help agency offices since they do not perform work at these 
sites. Temporary help arrangements may therefore inhibit collective action that would 
otherwise benefit workers. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that some firms use 
temporary help agencies to illegally screen out potential union organizers.14  
More broadly, some scholars have argued that the availability of temporary help 
agencies encourages employers to pursue a high turnover, low skill-investment human 
resources strategy (see, in particular, Benner, Leete and Pastor 2007, chapters 1 and 6). 
Were the LMI of temporary help unavailable, this argument suggests that employers 
would offer better job opportunities with greater opportunities for skill acquisition and 
labor market advancement.15  
Because they operate exclusively at the general equilibrium, macroeconomic level, 
these hypotheses are extremely difficult to test—even more so than person-level effects 
of temporary help employment studied by the four chapters in the volume. Moreover, 
alongside these arguments, one must alternatively consider that temporary help 
agencies may increase aggregate labor market efficiency and reduce unemployment by 
diminishing the time workers and firms spend in unproductive search (Katz and 
Krueger 1999).16 At this point, one can only confidently state that the question of how 
temporary help employment affects aggregate labor market efficiency and the quality of 
jobs available in general equilibrium is of first-order importance. A compelling answer 
to this question, however, awaits a suitably ingenious research design.  
                                                 
14 Reflecting the natural tensions between temporary help agencies and labor unions, Houseman, 
Kalleberg and Erickcek (2003) document specific union prohibitions on the use of temporary help 
agency workers at the auto parts manufacturers and hospitals that they study.  
15 Kaushik Basu (2003) provides a rigorous discussion of how laissez-faire bargaining among 
competitive workers and firms over the terms of employment can result in a market equilibrium 
that is not necessarily socially desirable.  
16 This positive aggregate benefit, if present, does not preclude the possibility that individual 
workers who use temporary-help agencies fare worse on average than those who do not; that is, 
the public good and the private good may have countervailing effects on individuals, even if the 
public good dominates on average.  24 
 
V.  Conclusions 
The labor market depicted by undergraduate textbooks is a pure spot market, 
characterized by complete information and atomistic price-taking. Labor economists 
have long understood that this model is highly incomplete. Search is costly, information 
is typically imperfect and often asymmetric, firms are not always price takers, and 
atomistic actors are typically unable to resolve coordination and collective action 
failures. In this ‘second-best of all worlds,’ there is scope for third parties to intercede, 
both to improve the operation of the labor market and to profit from its imperfections.  
One might have speculated, however, that in an era of rapid information flows and 
substantial job mobility, the importance of labor market intermediaries would wane. 
Indeed, the most prominent LMI, the traditional labor union, has been in secular 
declines for decades. Yet, the decline of labor unions as an LMI is the exception rather 
than the rule. Three of the LMIs studied in this volume—online search engines, criminal 
records providers and open-source unions—have only recently emerged. And a fourth, 
temporary help agencies, has risen from relative obscurity to international prominence 
over the last two decades.  
Though recent technological advances have made market information more 
abundant and less expensive, cheap information alone is rarely sufficient to solve the 
fundamental problems posed by costly and asymmetric information, adverse selection, 
and failures of collective action.17 Ultimately, the imperfections endemic to decentralized 
labor markets generate demand for institutions that can variously compel disclosure of 
hidden information, coordinate the actions of members of a congested market, or solve 
collective action failures among parties with complementary interests. The Labor Market 
Intermediaries studied in this volume perform these functions, though always 
imperfectly, and not without attendant costs and abuses. Despite widely heralded 
advances in the technology of job matching, it is my strong contention that Labor Market 
Intermediaries will continue to arise to address, ameliorate, and exploit the imperfect 
environment in which workers and employers interact. 
                                                 
17 Indeed, cheap information can in some cases exacerbate adverse selection by eliminating the 
signaling value of formerly costly actions such as submitting job applications (Autor 2001b). 25 
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